Aviation Masters, Episode 5 | Bruce Landsberg, Former NTSB Vice Chairman
When the NTSB’s former Vice Chairman sits down with one of general aviation’s most respected A&P/IAs, the conversation doesn’t stay polite for long. Mike Busch and Bruce Landsberg have known each other for nearly 40 years—long enough to skip the pleasantries and get straight to the things that actually matter: why GA pilots keep dying for the same preventable reasons, why annual inspections may be doing more harm than good, and why the data we need to fix the problem is already in our airplanes—if we’d bother to use it.
Landsberg recently completed Learning from Icarus, a 500-page examination of aviation accidents spanning his entire career—from flight instructor to FlightSafety International to the AOPA Air Safety Institute to the NTSB, where he served as Vice Chairman and participated in investigations across all modes of transportation. This episode gives him the chance to say, in plain language, what five decades of accident data have actually taught him.
The short version: we know what causes crashes. We’ve known for a long time. We’re just not doing enough about it.
About Bruce Landsberg
Bruce Landsberg spent more than two decades leading what is now the AOPA Air Safety Institute, where he helped pioneer data-driven safety education for general aviation pilots. Before that, he was an early champion of simulator training at FlightSafety International, helping build the case that realistic, scenario-based sim work saved lives in ways that gentle in-aircraft demonstrations simply could not.
At the NTSB, Landsberg served as a board member and Vice Chairman, participating in Go-Team investigations across aviation, rail, marine, and highway transportation. He is an active CFI with over 7,000 hours and more than 3,000 hours of dual given—and, as he freely admits, still learning.
Accidents vs. Crashes: A Distinction That Changes Everything
One of the first things Landsberg unpacks in this conversation is a distinction he encountered upon arriving at the NTSB—one that fundamentally reframes how the safety community should think about what happens when an airplane goes down.
An accident, in the NTSB’s formal definition, is rare, unforeseen, and unpredictable. A crash, by contrast, is something we understand. We know what happened, we know why it happened, and we have a solid picture of how to prevent it from happening again.
By that standard, nearly everything the NTSB investigates is a crash. “It’s pretty much the same stuff, different day,” Landsberg says. “We know how to prevent this stuff. It doesn’t need to happen.”
That framing has real implications for how the industry talks about safety. If we keep treating preventable events as though they were mysteries, we never build the urgency to act.
The Training That Actually Prepares You
Landsberg’s entry into aviation safety work came through simulator training, and his experience at FlightSafety left a lasting impression on how he thinks about what realistic preparation looks like.
The contrast he describes is striking: at Cessna, single-engine demonstrations on the 310 were performed at half-weight, at altitude, with the throttle pulled back gently to simulate zero thrust. Safe for the demo. Useless for the real world.
In the FlightSafety simulator, the same scenario—engine failure shortly after takeoff, Denver, warm evening, heavily loaded—was a fundamentally different experience. The airplane reacted immediately. There was no coddling. And there was no risk of actually crashing.
“You can accomplish 10 times as much in the sim per hour as you can training in the aircraft,” Mike Busch observes. Landsberg agrees completely. The sim teaches what the aircraft—for liability and safety reasons—cannot.
For GA pilots and owners, the practical takeaway is straightforward: if your insurance company or a training provider offers meaningful simulator time on your aircraft type, take it seriously. The scenario you rehearse there may someday be the scenario you actually face.
Maintenance-Induced Failures: What the Data Is Starting to Show
Mike Busch raises a subject he’s been examining for years: the statistical spike in mechanical-involved accidents during the first five flight hours after an aircraft comes out of annual inspection. While mechanical failure accounts for roughly 20% of GA accidents overall, that rate rises sharply in the immediate post-annual window, a strong signal that the inspection process itself introduces risk.
Landsberg doesn’t push back. “Maintenance is a risky business,” he says. The quality of the mechanic matters enormously. Who touches your airplane, and how carefully they work, shapes what happens to that airplane in the weeks that follow.
He describes his own experience: a recent owner-assisted annual, during which he watched a competent mechanic systematically work through the process with a checklist, demonstrating clear experience and thoroughness. He also made the connection to Savvy’s engine monitoring analysis—his upload had flagged a potential valve issue on cylinder number three. The borescope confirmed it. A valve lap and new roto coil later, compression jumped from 48 over 80 to 70 over 80.
That’s what proactive, data-driven maintenance looks like. Not waiting for the annual to surface a problem, but using continuous monitoring to catch developing issues before they become airworthiness concerns.
Phased Inspections and the 12-Month Paradox
Busch raises what he considers a fundamental inversion in the FAA’s safety logic: larger, more complex aircraft—King Airs, jets, airliners—operate under phased inspection programs, where different systems are inspected on different schedules based on actual risk and failure modes. Small GA piston aircraft are required to be disassembled nose-to-tail, wingtip-to-wingtip, every 12 months, regardless of condition.
Landsberg’s response is unambiguous: he agrees. More inspection is not automatically better inspection. Pulling inspection panels that show no signs of corrosion year after year accomplishes little beyond introducing more opportunities for maintenance error.
“Once you’ve taken a look, if it’s good, good. Let it go,” Landsberg says. “You don’t have to pull the inspection panel off every year to know there’s no corrosion in there.”
The argument for extending GA inspection intervals—or moving to a phased model—is not that owners want to defer maintenance. It’s that the current system creates risk in the name of safety. What the GA fleet needs is better inspection practice, not more of it.
Flight Data Monitoring: The Obvious Fix Nobody Has Deployed
One of the most forward-looking threads in this conversation is the discussion of flight data monitoring for GA aircraft.
Landsberg describes the Citation Jet Pilots Association’s experience: chronic problems with unstabilized approaches and hard landings, skyrocketing insurance rates, and a decision to implement flight data monitoring across the membership. The result was that CJP pilots lowered their incident rate below that of professional crews. TBM operators have now followed. Other owner-flown groups are watching closely.
The concept is straightforward: the airlines monitor every flight on every takeoff and landing. The capability already exists in many GA aircraft or can be retrofitted easily. If a pilot is consistently touching down 10 knots fast, the data makes that visible—and correctable—before it becomes an accident.
“If you can’t measure it, you’re not going to be able to predict,” Landsberg says.
This directly connects to Savvy Aviation’s core argument: engine monitor data, borescope imagery, and maintenance records aren’t mere paperwork exercises. They’re the feedback loop that separates reactive maintenance from intelligent management of an asset. The same logic applies to how we think about pilot performance.
Aging Pilots: What Experience Buys and What It Doesn’t
Busch, at 81, and Landsberg, at 76, bring something beyond credentials to this topic. They’re living it.
Landsberg’s view is nuanced. Age matters, but it’s not the primary variable. What matters more is when the pilot learned to fly, how deeply those skills were embedded, and whether they’re being actively maintained. Pilots who learned in their 20s and 30s tend to have grooves worn more deeply—skills that are more resistant to the cognitive erosion that comes with age.
What he’s less sanguine about is the self-assessment problem. Dunning-Krueger effects are real, and they’re particularly acute among pilots who have accumulated hours without accumulating humility. When Landsberg flies with aging pilot friends, he deliberately introduces a go-around—not to embarrass, but because that’s precisely where rhythm breaks down and errors compound.
The practical discipline for experienced older pilots: don’t let the gear go down at a different point every time. Don’t let checklist interruptions pass unremarked. And don’t let the feeling of competence substitute for the evidence of competence.
Risk Compensation: Safer Technology, Same Outcomes
Landsberg returns more than once to the concept of risk compensation—the well-documented tendency of pilots and drivers to offset technological safety improvements with incrementally riskier behavior. Anti-lock brakes didn’t reduce automotive crash rates. CAPS parachutes are saving lives on Cirrus aircraft, but only when pilots don’t treat them as a license to push margins.
The underlying mechanism is consistent: humans have a risk tolerance and find ways to spend whatever safety margin technology appears to offer. It’s not unique to aviation. It’s not even irrational. But it means that improvements in cockpit technology don’t automatically translate into safety improvements.
“We can make technology almost foolproof,” Landsberg says. “We can’t make it damn foolproof.”
The implication for aircraft owners: the Garmin in your panel is not a substitute for the judgment that belongs in your seat.
Why This Matters to Aircraft Owners
Everything in this conversation comes back to the same core question: what does an aircraft owner actually control?
More than most people think. You control who maintains your airplane and how closely you monitor that process. You control whether you use your engine monitor data or just archive it. You control whether you practice the maneuvers that will matter when things go wrong.
You don’t control whether the FAA modernizes the A&P certification system or allows phased inspections for GA aircraft. But you can make decisions today that reduce your exposure to maintenance-induced failures, that catch developing mechanical problems before they become airworthiness events, and that keep your skills calibrated to the airplane you actually fly.
That’s the owner-in-command mindset. And it’s exactly what this conversation is about.
Listen and Watch
This episode of Aviation Masters is available in full on YouTube and wherever you listen to podcasts. The conversation runs over two hours—worth every minute for anyone serious about operating a piston aircraft safely and intelligently.
Bruce Landsberg’s book: Learning from Icarus — learningfromicarus.com
Books by Mike Busch: savvyaviation.com/resources
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